Assumptions


There are many definitions for ‘ideology.’ Each agree at least (but not necessarily only) in so far as all denote a pre-established set of ideas, notions or beliefs that determine in advance an individual’s manifest thought, judgements or attitudes. But this is rarely all that is said about ideology, nor is it said about ideology alone. So, to assess any given theory of ideology should include an attempt to reveal premises undisclosed but governing the theorist’s discourse, lest that theory be later revealed itself ideologically informed. Once such prior thought were disclosed, the conclusions of the theory could be shown to have been guaranteed or secured by the functioning of such thought and would therefore have been predictable had the thought and all relevant conditions already been known. The hypothesis arises that were this approach applied, together with analysis of consistency and accuracy, to every definition and theory of ideology one of two potential results would obtain: (one) arrival at a comprehensive definition to which all other definitions and examples are reducible, or (two) the conclusion that sets of ideas, notions or beliefs will always predetermine any definition (the entire area of discourse thus a revolving door where reflection is continually caught in pursuit of that which, propelled by the chase, must inevitably escape). Either case would nonetheless yield conclusive knowledge. This hypothesis shall not be tested here. Suffice it to admit that these assumptions underpin the forthcoming discussions.

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One Response to Assumptions

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